Regulatory Guidance Framework

A Comprehensive Reference for National Regulators

Version: 1.1 Date: June 2026 Purpose: To provide evidence-based guidance for any country seeking to establish, enhance, or reform cryptocurrency mining regulations. Every recommendation in this document is grounded in verified data from real-world regulatory implementations across 27 jurisdictions (including the regional aggregates Southeast Asia, the Nordic Countries, and Africa (Emerging)).

Table of Contents

Part I: Context and Foundations

1. Executive Summary
2. Why This Document Exists
3. The Current Global Regulatory Landscape
4. International Organization Positions

Part II: Regulatory Dimensions (Deep Analysis)

1. Licensing and Registration
2. Energy and Environmental Regulation
3. Taxation
4. AML/KYC and Enforcement

Part III: Evidence and Outcomes

1. Economic Impact Analysis
2. Case Studies: What Works and What Doesn't

Part IV: Implementation

1. Implementation Roadmap
2. Country Profile Decision Matrix

Appendices

• A. Global Regulatory Comparison Tables
• B. Source Index
• C. Verification Notes

1. Executive Summary

Cryptocurrency mining — the process of using computational power to validate blockchain transactions and earn newly created cryptocurrency — has become a significant global industry consuming an estimated 130-173 TWh of electricity annually (comparable to a mid-sized country; the Bitcoin network alone reached ~173 TWh in 2025 per Cambridge CCAF/CBECI, industry/academic-reported), attracting billions of dollars in investment, and presenting governments with a complex regulatory challenge that sits at the intersection of energy policy, financial regulation, environmental protection, tax policy, and national security.

This document synthesizes the regulatory approaches of 27 jurisdictions, verified against official sources (and flagging industry-reported figures as such), to provide actionable guidance for national regulators.

The Regulatory Spectrum

Based on our analysis of all 27 jurisdictions, each falls along a spectrum. The stance distribution is: 2 outright bans, 1 punitive, 17 balanced, 6 permissive, and 1 state-operated (regional aggregates classified by their dominant posture).

Note: Kazakhstan and the Nordic Countries combine balanced legalisation with restrictive licensing/tax pressure — Kazakhstan localises mining to registered entities, while Sweden's tax/VAT pressure drove a reported 68% of surveyed miners to plan relocation by 2026 and Norway has asked its Parliament (12 Mar 2026) for a bill to ban new PoW data centres (not yet enacted).

The Five Non-Negotiable Elements

Regardless of where a country falls on the spectrum, our analysis identifies five elements that every effective mining regulatory framework must include:

1. Clear legal status — Mining must be explicitly legal, illegal, or conditionally permitted. Ambiguity (

   Saudi Arabia model — the only binding instrument, a 2018 standing-committee warning, addresses trading/dealing, not the computational act of mining) deters legitimate investment while providing no enforcement mechanism against illicit activity.

2. Energy integration — Mining regulation cannot exist separately from energy policy. Countries that failed to integrate the two (Ethiopia, which froze all new miner power permits in August 2025 citing a grid at capacity; Kazakhstan pre-reform) experienced grid strain. Kazakhstan's November 2025 reform (Law No. 231-VIII) legalised mining nationwide beyond the AIFC and repealed the former mandatory-domestic-sales quota, signalling a shift toward predictable energy-levy-based regulation.

3. Proportionate AML/KYC — FATF explicitly excludes miners from VASP classification (Paragraphs 72, 83 of 2021 Updated Guidance) but mining can still be a money laundering vector ($1.8B in illicit crypto moved through mining pool-associated addresses per Chainalysis).

4. Enforceable registration — Countries without mandatory registration (pre-2024 Paraguay, early Ethiopia) have no visibility into who is mining, how much power they consume, or whether they comply with any rules.

5. Tax clarity — The tax treatment of mining income must be unambiguous. Countries that got this wrong (

   India's zero cost basis,
   Japan's pre-reform ~55% rate) either crushed the industry or drove it offshore. Japan enacted a flat ~20% (20.315%) separate-taxation regime on 31 March 2026, though it applies only from 1 January 2028.

What This Document Is NOT

• This is not a recommendation to adopt or ban crypto mining. That is a sovereign policy decision.
• This is not legal advice. It is a reference framework informed by global evidence.
• This is not static. The regulatory landscape is evolving rapidly, and this document should be updated as new data becomes available.

2. Why This Document Exists

The Regulatory Gap

As of June 2026, no comprehensive international standard for crypto mining regulation exists. This finding, confirmed through our analysis of positions from the IMF, FATF, OECD, Basel Committee, World Bank, IEA, and UNCTAD, means that:

• FATF explicitly excludes miners from VASP classification (2021 Updated Guidance, Paragraphs 72, 83)
• OECD CARF explicitly excludes miners/validators from Reporting Crypto-Asset Service Provider (RCASP) status
• IMF provides a nine-element framework for crypto assets broadly (Policy Paper 2023/004) but no mining-specific guidance
• Basel Committee addresses bank exposure to crypto (Standard d545, 1,250% risk weight for unbacked crypto) but not mining operations directly
• IEA reports on mining energy consumption (Electricity 2024: 120 TWh Bitcoin in 2023) but does not issue regulatory recommendations

This means every country must essentially build its mining regulatory framework from scratch, drawing on the experience of other jurisdictions rather than adopting an internationally agreed template.

The Stakes

The stakes of getting this wrong are significant:

• Energy security: Ethiopia froze all new miner power permits in August 2025 citing a grid at capacity, then scheduled industry-reported tariff increases (30% Dec 2025, 24% Jul 2026, 28% Jul 2027) projected to render ~half of operations unprofitable by mid-2026. Kazakhstan experienced rolling blackouts partly attributed to unregulated mining consuming 15-20% of peak electricity (the earlier "~33% of Ethiopia's national power" figure could not be verified against a primary source and is no longer asserted as fact).
• Economic opportunity: Paraguay's mining sector has attracted over $1.5 billion in investment across 60+ sites and generates ANDE roughly $12 million per month (ANDE-reported); Paraguay accounts for ~4.3% of global Bitcoin hashrate (~43 EH/s, industry-reported, Hashrate Index, Q2 2026). Bhutan's sovereign DHI mining program has mined over 13,000 BTC since 2019 (industry/operator-reported).
• Financial integrity: Chainalysis documented $1.8 billion in illicit cryptocurrency moving through mining pool-associated addresses, demonstrating that mining can be exploited for money laundering if left unregulated.
• Fiscal revenue: Georgia's zero-tax approach (0% for individuals, 0% VAT) attracted mining investment — crypto-mining electricity use tripled to ~752M kWh (~5% of national consumption) in 2025 (GNERC-reported) — but generates near-zero government revenue. India's punitive 30% flat tax (with zero cost basis) drove 60-87% of trading volume offshore, also generating minimal revenue. The optimal point lies between these extremes.

3. The Current Global Regulatory Landscape

Regulatory Status by Country (June 2026)

Detailed regulation files for each country are available in the /regulations/ directory of this repository. The table below provides a summary:

Legal Status

Tax Treatment Comparison

Energy and Environmental Requirements

4. International Organization Positions

Full analysis: International Organization Frameworks

Key Findings

The Critical Gap

No international body has issued a comprehensive, mining-specific regulatory framework. Countries must build their own, which is precisely what this guidance document is designed to support.

5. Licensing and Registration

Full analysis: Licensing Frameworks

The Six Licensing Models

Based on global evidence, we identify six distinct models that countries have adopted:

Model 1: No License Required

• Examples:
  Germany (under MiCA/KMAG),
  Georgia (VASP Law 2023 explicitly exempts miners),
  Singapore (PSA 2019)
• When it works: When the country's energy grid has ample capacity and general business/tax laws provide sufficient oversight
• When it fails: When mining grows rapidly and overwhelms grid capacity with no advance warning mechanism

Model 2: Registration Only

• Examples: Texas (SB 1929 / PURA §39.360, >75 MW), Norway (data-centre registry under the Data Centre Regulation, effective 1 Jan 2025),
  Russia (Law 221-FZ, FTS registry; individuals >6,000 kWh/month must register as a business)
• When it works: Provides visibility without imposing heavy compliance costs; works well as a first step
• When it fails: If registration has no enforcement mechanism (Russia: only ~30% of miners registered mid-2025, leaving an estimated ~70% — 140,000-200,000 farms — unregistered despite legalization; the FTS now counts ~196,900 active farms via AI energy-monitoring, up ~44% in 2025)

Model 3: Full Licensing

• Examples:
  Kazakhstan (AIFC, 3-year license, 4-person board, 6-9 month processing), Nigeria (SEC, N500M minimum capital),
  Uzbekistan (NAPP)
• When it works: Gives government maximum control over who operates and how
• When it fails: High barriers exclude small operators and drive activity underground (Kazakhstan: 95% of activity reportedly outside the legal system)

Model 4: Special Economic Zone

• Examples: Bhutan (GMC), UAE (ADGM/DMCC/VARA),
  El Salvador (geothermal zones)
• When it works: Concentrates activity in regulated areas with appropriate infrastructure
• When it fails: Can create two-tier systems (Bhutan: permissive for government, restrictive for citizens)

Model 5: State Monopoly

• Examples: Bhutan (DHI), Paraguay (ANDE pilot with seized equipment)
• When it works: Country has cheap surplus renewable energy and treats mining as national revenue strategy
• When it fails: Creates concentration/treasury-volatility risk (Bhutan: BTC holdings reportedly sold down ~70% from peak; strategy shifted from accumulation to treasury management — Arkham/CoinDesk, industry-reported, disputed by DHI)

Model 6: Prohibition

• Examples: China (NDRC September 2021 industrial-restructuring catalogue + inter-agency notice; reaffirmed Feb 6, 2026 eight-agency "Ban 2.0"),
  Venezuela (May 2024 grid disconnection), New York (fossil-fuel PoW moratorium 2022-2024)
• When it works: Never fully — China still has ~14% of global hashrate (CryptoQuant 15-20%) despite the ban, third-largest hub as of Nov 2025
• When it fails: Drives mining underground, eliminates tax revenue, loses regulatory oversight

Recommended Three-Tier Framework

Based on the evidence, we recommend a tiered approach that scales requirements proportionally:

6. Energy and Environmental Regulation

Full analysis: Energy & Environmental Regulation

Why Energy Must Be Central to Mining Regulation

Mining regulation is fundamentally energy regulation. Every country that treated mining as purely a financial or technology matter — without integrating energy policy — experienced negative outcomes:

• Ethiopia: Mining consumed an estimated 33% of national power; government froze all new permits (August 2025) and plans to phase out mining entirely
• Kazakhstan: 15-20% of peak electricity consumed by mining; contributed to rolling blackouts in 2021-2022
• Iceland: Grid running at 95%+ capacity; had to impose emergency caps

Key Energy Data Points (Verified)

Recommended Energy Framework

Four-tier energy regulation based on global evidence:

Grid stability safeguards:

• National cap: Mining should not exceed 5% of national peak electricity demand without explicit government approval
• Mandatory demand response: All operations >10 MW must participate in curtailment programs during grid stress
• Dynamic pricing: Mining tariff at 1.5-2x industrial rate (per Quebec and Kazakhstan precedent, but not so high as to be prohibitive)
• Moratorium trigger: If mining load growth exceeds 15% annually, automatic review period before new permits issued

7. Taxation

Full analysis: Taxation Frameworks

The Tax Design Challenge

The taxation section must address three distinct taxable events:

1. Mining reward at receipt — When a miner receives newly minted cryptocurrency
2. Operating expense deductibility — Whether electricity, hardware, and infrastructure costs can be offset against mining income
3. Disposal of mined cryptocurrency — Capital gains when mined crypto is later sold or exchanged

Lessons from Global Tax Approaches

What clearly doesn't work:

• India's zero cost basis (Section 115BBH): Taxing the full sale price of mined crypto with no deduction for electricity, hardware, or infrastructure is economically equivalent to taxing revenue rather than profit. Result: industry-reported 60-87% trading-volume decline, ~$42B traded offshore (Jul 2022-Jul 2023, Esya Centre). This approach generates minimal revenue because it destroys the tax base.
• Japan's pre-reform ~55% rate: The highest effective crypto tax rate among major economies drove activity to lower-tax jurisdictions. Japan enacted a flat ~20% (20.315%) separate-taxation regime on 31 March 2026, applicable from 1 January 2028 — an implicit acknowledgment the high rate failed (whether mined crypto qualifies for the flat rate is not yet verified).
• Zero tax (
  Georgia model): Attracts investment but generates near-zero government revenue from the sector. Sustainable only if the country has other policy objectives (e.g., becoming a tech hub) that justify foregoing mining tax revenue.

What works:

• Germany's 1-year holding exemption: Miners who hold mined crypto >1 year before selling pay zero capital gains tax. Incentivizes long-term holding, reduces speculative selling, and is administratively simple.
• US business deduction model: Mining expenses (electricity, hardware depreciation, facility costs) are fully deductible against mining income. Taxes profit, not revenue. Standard business tax principles applied to mining.
• Kazakhstan's electricity surcharge: 2 tenge/kWh surcharge creates a simple, predictable tax mechanism tied to actual energy consumption rather than volatile crypto prices. Easy to administer; hard to evade.

Recommended Tax Framework

8. AML/KYC and Enforcement

Full analysis: AML/KYC Enforcement

FATF Position on Mining

The FATF's October 2021 Updated Guidance (Paragraphs 72, 83) explicitly excludes miners from VASP classification — provided they solely validate transactions and do not also engage in exchange, transfer, or custodial services. Transaction fees paid to miners are also exempt from Travel Rule requirements.

However, this exclusion does not mean mining poses zero AML risk. Chainalysis documented $1.8 billion in illicit cryptocurrency moving through mining pool-associated addresses, demonstrating that mining pools in particular can be exploited for money laundering (the "clean coins" problem — freshly mined cryptocurrency has no transaction history and thus no criminal taint).

Recommended AML/KYC Framework

Proportionate to scale, focused on the actual risk points:

Enforcement: What Actually Works

Key lesson: Electricity monitoring is the single most effective enforcement mechanism across all jurisdictions studied. Mining operations >1 MW cannot realistically hide their power consumption. Countries should invest in this capability early.

9. Economic Impact Analysis

Full analysis: Economic Outcomes Analysis

Verified Economic Benefits

Verified Economic Costs

Net Assessment by Regulatory Approach

10. Case Studies: What Works and What Doesn't

Failure Case 1: China's Complete Ban

Action: Comprehensive prohibition of mining (2021 NDRC industrial-restructuring catalogue + the September 24, 2021 inter-agency notice), reaffirmed by the February 6, 2026 eight-agency "Ban 2.0" notice that extended controls to OTC trading, offshore yuan-pegged stablecoins, and RWA tokenization. Enforced via electricity/"energy-signature" monitoring, blockchain forensics, and banking compliance checks.

Outcome: Failed to eliminate mining. China re-emerged as the third-largest mining hub at ~14% of global hashrate (Hashrate Index/Luxor; CryptoQuant 15-20%, methodology-caveated geolocation/pool-IP estimates) as of November 2025, concentrated in Xinjiang and Sichuan. Government lost all tax revenue, regulatory oversight, and economic benefits while the environmental rationale was undermined (underground miners use the cheapest energy available, not the cleanest).

Lesson: Outright bans are ineffective at eliminating mining. They merely push it underground and offshore.

Failure Case 2: India's Punitive Taxation

Action: 30% flat tax on all crypto gains (Section 115BBH, now Sec 194 of the Income-tax Act, 2025), zero cost basis for mined crypto (no deduction for electricity, hardware, infrastructure), 1% TDS on every transfer (Section 194S), no loss offset.

Outcome: Industry-reported 60-87% decline in trading volume; ~$42B traded offshore (Jul 2022-Jul 2023, Esya Centre). Minimal tax revenue collected because the tax base was destroyed. The Union Budget 2026-27 (Feb 1, 2026) retained the 30% VDA tax and 1% TDS unchanged, and the comprehensive crypto discussion paper was reportedly shelved again (at least the fifth deferral since July 2024).

Lesson: Punitive taxation functions as a de facto ban but without the clarity of an actual prohibition. Taxing revenue rather than profit (zero cost basis) contradicts basic tax principles and destroys the industry.

Failure Case 3: Venezuela's Institutional Collapse

Action: Well-designed licensing system under SUNACRIP (Constituent Decree on Cryptoassets): registration, licensing, national mining pool, 500+ licensed centers.

Outcome: SUNACRIP collapsed due to corruption (March 2023: 10+ staff arrested, $3M+ misappropriated — distinct from the broader $3B+ PDVSA scheme). Mining subsequently banned from the grid (May 2024), reaffirmed May 2026 and enforced via militarized raids (Operación Cazador, May 18 2026: ~4,000 ASIC machines seized). Regulatory vacuum persists.

Lesson: Regulatory design is necessary but not sufficient. Institutional integrity safeguards (independent oversight, audit mechanisms, transparent governance) are essential.

Success Case 1: Texas Grid Integration

Action: SB 1929 / PURA §39.360: Registration for >75 MW facilities, classification as "large flexible loads" eligible for demand response programs, $25,000/day/violation penalties.

Outcome: Miners participate in ERCOT curtailment during grid stress. Riot Platforms received $31.7M in curtailment credits (August 2023). Mining became a grid reliability asset rather than a liability. Billions in investment attracted.

Lesson: Integrating mining into the energy system (rather than treating it as a separate regulatory problem) converts a liability into an asset.

Success Case 2: Bhutan's Sovereign Mining

Action: State-run mining through DHI using 100% hydroelectric power (600 MW total capacity; facilities at Gedu 100 MW and Jigmeling/Sarpang 500 MW). Seasonal model: monsoon surplus → mining; winter scarcity → shutdown. Bitdeer Technologies is the primary mining partner.

Outcome: Mined over 13,000 BTC since 2019 (industry/operator-reported). Funded the Gelephu Mindfulness City (December 2025 "Bitcoin Development Pledge" up to 10,000 BTC, ~$1B). 100% renewable energy = strong ESG narrative; positioned as "green Bitcoin mining" in the world's first carbon-negative country.

Risks materialized: Strategy shifted from accumulation to treasury management; Arkham/CoinDesk attribute ~$1B in BTC leaving Bhutan wallets since mid-2025 with tracked holdings down ~70% from peak (DHI CEO disputes the sale narrative; tracked holdings ~3,100 BTC by mid-2026). Mining inflows may have halted (no inflow >$100K in over a year as of April 2026, industry-reported).

Lesson: Sovereign mining can work for countries with cheap surplus renewable energy, but requires strict treasury risk management (concentration limits, regular profit-taking, diversification).

Success Case 3: EU MiCA Disclosure Approach

Action: Rejected a proposed PoW ban (ECON Committee, March 2022, voted 30-23 against). Instead adopted mandatory sustainability disclosures (MiCA Article 19): energy consumption, renewable mix, GHG emissions. Enhanced disclosure above 500,000 kWh/year. EU Taxonomy classification still undelivered (the March 2026 EU Taxonomy revision consultation did NOT add crypto mining). The MiCA transitional period ends 1 July 2026 (hard stop, no further extensions).

Outcome: Mining continues under transparency requirements. No ban-driven capital flight. Environmental data collected for evidence-based future policy. Cross-border consistency through harmonized rules (~204 CASPs authorized across ~23 EEA states as of 22 May 2026).

Lesson: "Transparency over prohibition" gives regulators data for evidence-based decisions while preserving economic activity and investment.

11. Implementation Roadmap

Full analysis: Implementation Guide

For Countries Starting from Zero: A Three-Year Plan

Year 1: Foundation

Year 2: Implementation

Year 3: Full Operation

12. Country Profile Decision Matrix

Different countries have different starting conditions. Use this matrix to identify which regulatory models are most relevant to your country's profile:

Profile A: Hydropower-Rich, Developing Economy

Examples: Nepal,

Bhutan,

Paraguay, Ethiopia, Laos, Tajikistan

Key considerations:

• Surplus renewable energy that is currently exported at low rates or wasted
• Limited existing regulatory capacity
• Potential for significant GDP impact (positive or negative)
• Geopolitical considerations with energy export partners

Recommended approach:

• Start with registration-based framework (Tier 1/2 from Section 5)
• Mandatory energy integration from Day 1 (grid stability caps, demand response)
• Consider state mining pilot for surplus energy (Bhutan/Paraguay model) with strict risk management
• Cap mining at percentage of national power (recommend 5-10%) to avoid Ethiopia's 33% crisis
• Simple tax: per-kWh surcharge (Kazakhstan model) is easier to administer than income-based taxation for developing economies

Profile B: Energy-Constrained, Large Economy

Examples:

India, Nigeria,

South Africa, Kenya, Pakistan

Key considerations:

• Residential and industrial electricity needs already unmet
• Mining competes with development priorities
• Large informal economy complicates enforcement
• High capital requirements may exclude domestic participants

Recommended approach:

• Restrictive but not prohibitive (avoid India's punitive tax mistake)
• Strong energy safeguards: mining only with dedicated/off-grid renewable energy, not from the national grid
• Lower licensing capital requirements than Nigeria's N500M to enable domestic participation
• Focus AML requirements on mining pools and large operators, not individuals
• Tax at moderate rates (15-20%) with full expense deductibility

Profile C: Developed Economy, Ample Grid

Examples:

US states,

Canada (Alberta),

Australia,

Germany,

France

Key considerations:

• Existing regulatory infrastructure can be adapted
• Grid can absorb mining load with proper management
• Sophisticated tax system already in place
• International competitiveness matters

Recommended approach:

• Texas integration model: registration + demand response + grid stability
• MiCA-style disclosure for environmental transparency
• Standard business tax treatment (ordinary income, full deductions)
• Demand response programs that convert miners into grid reliability assets
• State/provincial flexibility within federal framework

Profile D: Small Economy, Strategic Positioning

Examples:

Georgia,

UAE,

Singapore,

El Salvador, small island nations

Key considerations:

• Mining as an economic diversification strategy
• Limited domestic mining but can attract international operators
• Regulatory arbitrage as competitive advantage
• Reputational considerations

Recommended approach:

• Special economic zone model (UAE/VARA, Bhutan/GMC)
• Competitive but not zero tax (UAE's 9% corporate with free zone 0% qualifying is a model)
• Strong AML/KYC to maintain international standing (FATF gray list risk)
• Focus on attracting headquarters, technology companies, and service providers rather than pure mining operations

Appendix A: Global Regulatory Comparison Tables

Complete Licensing Comparison

Complete Tax Comparison

Appendix B: Source Index

This document and its supporting analyses draw on sources from the following categories:

Official Government Sources:

• IRS (US), HMRC (UK), ATO (Australia), CRA (Canada), SARS (South Africa), BZSt (Germany)
• SEC, CFTC, FinCEN (US); FCA (UK); ESMA, EBA (EU); FSA (Japan); MAS (Singapore)
• RMA (Bhutan); AIFC (Kazakhstan); VARA (Dubai); NAPP (Uzbekistan); SEPRELAD (Paraguay)
• State/provincial regulators: PUCT (Texas), DFS (New York), BC Utilities Commission

International Organizations:

• IMF: Policy Paper 2023/004; Country Reports; Article IV Consultations
• FATF: Updated Guidance on Virtual Assets and VASPs (October 2021); Targeted Updates (2023-2025)
• OECD: Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF, 2023)
• Basel Committee: Standard d545; Disclosure framework DIS55
• World Bank: Bhutan Development Update (2024)
• IEA: Electricity 2024 Report
• UNCTAD: Policy Briefs 100-102 (2022); Digital Economy Report 2024
• UN (UNU): Earth's Future study (October 2023)
• Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance: CBECI; Bitcoin Mining Map

Legislation and Regulation (selected):

• US: Executive Order (Jan 23, 2025); SB 1929 (Texas); GENIUS Act (S.1582); CLARITY Act (H.R. 3633)
• EU: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA); Directive 2023/2226 (DAC8)
• Russia: Law No. 221-FZ (August 8, 2024)
• Kazakhstan: Law No. 193-VII (April 1, 2023)
• India: Section 115BBH Income Tax Act
• New York: Chapter 628, Laws of 2022 (PoW moratorium)
• Norway: LOV-2024-12-13-76 (Data Center Registry)
• Paraguay: Law 7572/2025; DNIT Resolution 47/26

Full source URLs are provided in each section-level document linked from this guidance.

Appendix C: Verification Notes

This document adheres to a strict verification standard, mirroring the canonical per-jurisdiction fact matrix. Every factual claim is sourced from that matrix; where primary sources could not be located or verified, this is explicitly flagged as "NOT VERIFIED" or "industry-reported" rather than asserted as fact. This refresh covers all 27 jurisdictions (including the regional aggregates Southeast Asia, the Nordic Countries, and Africa (Emerging)); no new jurisdictions were added this cycle.

Corrections applied in this refresh (June 2026):

• China: hashrate share corrected from "14-21%" to ~14% (Hashrate Index/Luxor; CryptoQuant 15-20%), third-largest hub as of Nov 2025; the Feb 6, 2026 eight-agency "Ban 2.0" notice added, and the November 2025 PBoC-led reaffirmation that all crypto activity remains illegal noted.
• Kazakhstan: mandatory-domestic-sales quota repealed by Law No. 231-VIII (Nov 17, 2025; in force ~mid-Jan 2026), which legalised mining nationwide beyond the AIFC; tax corrected to 20% CIT / 10-15% individual entrepreneurs.
• Russia: registered-miner count corrected — ~30% registered mid-2025 (~70%, est. 140,000-200,000 farms, unregistered); FTS AI-monitoring counts ~196,900 active farms (up ~44% in 2025); seasonal Siberian bans (Buryatia/Zabaikalsky Krai) expired 15 March 2026, no new 2026 bans signalled.
• El Salvador: Bitcoin legal-tender status repealed January 29, 2025 (passed 55-2) as an IMF EFF condition; public sector must cease BTC accumulation via purchases and mining.
• Paraguay: Bitfarms completed its Latin America exit in January 2026 (final Paso Pe site sold to Sympatheia Power Fund for up to $30M); HIVE Digital remains a leading operator (~18.87 EH/s / 400 MW); investment >$1.5B across 60+ sites.
• Ethiopia: the "~33% of national power" figure could not be verified against a primary source and is no longer asserted as fact; the August 2025 EEP permit freeze and tariff-increase schedule are used instead.
• Japan: tax reform corrected — the flat ~20% (20.315%) separate-taxation regime was enacted 31 March 2026 but applies only from 1 January 2028.

Items that could not be fully verified against primary legal text (flagged in section documents):

• Venezuela: Specific decree text for the May 2024 mining ban (SUNACRIP dysfunction limits public records); residential-node hashrate "~65% drop" is media-reported, not verified against CBECI/CCAF.
• Saudi Arabia: no mining-specific law, tariff, tax, or enforcement action verified against a primary source; secondary "~4% of global hashrate" and "20% mining tax" claims deliberately omitted as unverified.
• Bhutan: BTC holdings/outflow figures are Arkham/CoinDesk industry-reported and disputed by DHI; Income Tax Act treatment of cryptocurrency NOT VERIFIED.
• Kazakhstan / Georgia / France / Germany / UK / South Africa: no country-specific CBECI/CCAF hashrate breakdown published; any hashrate figure is industry-reported or NOT VERIFIED.

Data reliability notes:

• CBECI acknowledges its own estimates may be too high due to outdated mining-map data; CCAF's 2025 US hashrate share (~75.4% of surveyed activity) is acknowledged by CCAF as overstated.
• Bitcoin energy consumption estimates range widely across studies (130-173 TWh) depending on methodology; the Bitcoin network reached ~173 TWh in 2025 (Cambridge CCAF/CBECI).
• Hashrate/energy figures for individual jurisdictions (Paraguay ~4.3%, Ethiopia ~2.6%, China ~14%, El Salvador ~1.1 EH/s, Russia ~196,900 farms) are industry/state-reported with named methodology sources (Hashrate Index, Luxor, CryptoQuant, FTS AI monitoring), not independently audited.
• Employment data for mining is sparse; most figures are industry-reported rather than government-verified.

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This is a living document. Last updated June 2026, mirroring the canonical crypto-mining fact matrix across all 27 jurisdictions. All supporting analysis documents are available in the guidance-document/ directory of this repository.