Economic Outcomes

1. The Evidence Base

Which CBDCs Have Enough Data to Assess Outcomes?

As of June 2026, only a small number of retail CBDCs have operated long enough to generate meaningful outcome data. Across the 20 jurisdictions surveyed in this domain, just six have launched or operated a CBDC at retail scale — the

Bahamas Sand Dollar,

Nigeria's eNaira,

Jamaica's JAM-DEX, the Eastern Caribbean's DCash (pilot concluded, successor suspended),

China's e-CNY (pilot-scale), and

India's Digital Rupee (e₹, pilot). The remaining 14 are at research, design, or pre-issuance pilot stages, and one — the

United States — is the only major economy with a formal anti-CBDC stance (Executive Order 14178 bars all federal CBDC activity). The BIS 2024 survey found that 91% of 93 central banks are exploring CBDCs, with 49 pilot projects active globally, yet only this handful has moved beyond experimentation into sustained operation. The evidence base is therefore narrow but instructive.

CBDCs with substantive operational data (12+ months of live or pilot operation):

CBDCs in advanced preparation or wholesale-pilot without retail launch data:

The

EU digital euro remains in preparation (preparation phase closed October 2025; Governing Council moved to the next phase 29-30 October 2025; a 12-month PSP pilot is scheduled for H2 2027 and potential first issuance "during 2029," contingent on the EU adopting the Regulation).

Sweden's e-Krona is a research/analysis programme — its four-phase technical pilot concluded in 2024 with no issuance decision, and the Riksbank now ties any decision to the digital euro timeline. The

UK digital pound is in design phase (decision on whether to proceed expected later in 2026).

Japan expects a 2026 decision on the Digital Yen but maintains "no plan to issue."

Russia's digital ruble has a legally-mandated large-scale launch date of 1 September 2026, with narrow live government/budget use since 1 January 2026 — but not yet a full live retail launch.

Singapore and

Australia have issued wholesale CBDC in live pilots (Singapore's first live wholesale transaction November 2025; Australia's Project Acacia issued A$4.4m of wholesale CBDC, final report 18 May 2026) but assessed no public-interest case for a retail CBDC.

South Korea (Project Hangang),

Thailand (retail pilot concluded 2024, no launch),

Brazil (Drex — Hyperledger Besu platform decommissioned 4 November 2025, rebuilding from scratch),

Canada (retail work scaled down September 2024),

Ghana (eCedi pilot declared "completed" 22 May 2026, reframed to wholesale/cross-border), and

South Africa (Position Paper 27 November 2025: no compelling immediate need for retail CBDC) round out the research/pilot field. None of these produces sustained retail adoption outcome data yet. Their primary economic data point is projected development cost (where disclosed) or wholesale-pilot throughput.

Key limitation: No large advanced economy has launched a retail CBDC. China's e-CNY is the closest, but its January 1, 2026 reclassification from central bank liability (M0) toward a commercial bank deposit-money model means it may no longer qualify as a CBDC under standard definitions, as noted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE).

Sources:

• BIS Papers No. 159, "Advancing in tandem -- results of the 2024 BIS survey on central bank digital currencies and crypto," August 2025 -- Link
• IMF, "Central Bank Digital Currency: Further Navigating Challenges and Risks," Policy Paper No. 2025/041, November 2025 -- Link
• PIIE, "China gives up on state-backed digital cash," 2026 -- Link

Adoption Metrics: What to Measure

The IMF's CBDC Adoption Fintech Note (FTN 2024/005) and BIS survey data identify the following as the critical adoption metrics:

1. Wallet creation -- number of accounts opened (indicates awareness, not usage)
2. Active users -- users who transact at least once in a 30/90-day period (the meaningful metric)
3. Transaction volume -- number of transactions processed (indicates utility)
4. Transaction value -- monetary throughput (indicates economic significance)
5. Merchant acceptance -- number of merchants actively processing CBDC payments (indicates ecosystem viability)
6. Share of payments -- CBDC as percentage of total digital payments or cash in circulation (indicates displacement effect)
7. Average transaction value -- reveals whether CBDC is used for meaningful commerce or small-value testing

The critical distinction is between wallet creation and active usage. Every launched CBDC shows a dramatic gap between the two, which is the central finding of CBDC economic outcomes to date.

Source: IMF, "CBDC Adoption: Inclusive Strategies for Intermediaries and Users," Fintech Note 2024/005, September 2024 -- Link

Development Costs Where Known

The EU digital euro is the only program to have published detailed cost projections. The EUR 1.3 billion development figure covers both externally and internally developed components through projected first issuance in 2029. Framework agreements with EU-controlled service providers (announced October 2, 2025) have a total estimated spend of EUR 432.1 million and a potential maximum of EUR 1.164 billion. The ECB plans to fund these costs through seigniorage revenues, similar to banknote operations. South Korea offers a rare partial disclosure: each of the seven banks in Project Hangang Phase 1 reportedly spent ~5 billion won (~US$3.7M) on infrastructure against only 692.46 million won (~US$515,000) in total pilot transaction value — a stark cost-to-activity imbalance.

For developing countries, CBDC development costs are not typically disclosed but are understood to be significant relative to central bank budgets. The IMF has noted that CBDC implementation requires "significant investment in technological infrastructure including capital expenditure, operational costs... to ensure sufficient infrastructure in countries with dispersed geography and a resilient system accessible 24/7/365."

Sources:

• ECB, "Preparation phase closing report," October 2025 -- Link
• ECB, "Eurosystem moving to next phase of digital euro project," October 30, 2025 -- Link
• ECB, "Selected service providers," October 2, 2025 -- Link

2. Launched CBDC Outcomes Table

The following table consolidates available data for all CBDCs that have been launched or operated in pilot for an extended period. All adoption and transaction figures are self-reported by the issuing central bank (or compiled by trackers such as the HRF CBDC Tracker) and have not been independently audited; they should be treated as indicative. All figures are the most recent available as of June 2026.

Key Observations from the Data

1. The wallet-activity gap is universal. Every launched CBDC shows a dramatic disparity between wallets created and active usage. Nigeria's 98.5% inactivity rate (per IMF WP/23/104) is the starkest example, but the pattern holds across all jurisdictions. Wallet creation is a poor proxy for adoption.

2. Circulation as share of money supply is negligible everywhere. No launched CBDC has exceeded 0.5% of currency in circulation. The Bahamas at 0.39%, Nigeria at 0.37%, Jamaica at approximately 0.1%, the Eastern Caribbean at ~0.16%, and China at ~0.16% of M0 all indicate that CBDCs are not displacing cash or meaningfully affecting money supply.

3. India's first contraction is a new and important data point. For the first time, a major pilot has shrunk: e₹-R circulation fell ~24% year-on-year to ₹771.7 crore (~US$90M) at 31 March 2026, down from ₹1,016.5 crore a year earlier (RBI Annual Report 2025-26, self-reported). The earlier 334% surge (FY2024-25) reversing into decline underscores how fragile incentive-driven adoption can be once promotional pushes fade.

4. China is an outlier in absolute volume but not in relative penetration. While the e-CNY's cumulative CNY 16.7 trillion (~USD 2.37 trillion) in transactions is impressive in absolute terms, Alipay and WeChat Pay together process over 90% of China's mobile payments. The average transaction value has declined from CNY 1,895 (2023) to CNY 428 (2025), suggesting a shift toward smaller, possibly incentivized transactions rather than genuine commercial displacement. The April 2, 2026 doubling of authorized operators to 22 reads as a transition toward full-scale deployment, even as the January 2026 reclassification toward deposit money raises whether e-CNY remains a "pure" CBDC.

5. Cash is increasing, not decreasing, in CBDC jurisdictions. The Bahamas reports a 20% increase in physical cash circulation despite the Sand Dollar. In Jamaica, Hurricane Melissa (October 2025) drove currency in circulation up ~13% YoY to ~J$295.67bn by November 2025. This directly contradicts the assumption that CBDC availability would naturally reduce cash usage.

Sources:

• Ledger Insights, "China's digital yuan CBDC processes $2 trillion" -- Link
• The Tribune (Bahamas), "Bahamas 'going in reverse' through 20% cash increase," January 17, 2025 -- Link
• IMF, "Nigeria's eNaira, One Year After," WP/23/104, May 2023 -- Link
• Silicon Caribe, "Bank of Jamaica Pushes Banks to Accelerate JAM-DEX Adoption," March 2, 2026 -- Link
• RBI, "Annual Report 2025-26," May 29, 2026 (e₹-R circulation ₹771.7 crore, ~24% YoY decline) -- Link
• CNBC, "Interest-bearing e-CNY shows previous efforts to promote digital yuan didn't really work," January 7, 2026 -- Link

3. Cost-Benefit Analysis

3.1 Development and Infrastructure Costs

CBDC development costs span multiple categories that policymakers must budget for:

Category 1: Core Platform Development

• Settlement engine design and implementation
• Ledger infrastructure (centralized or DLT-based)
• Cryptographic security architecture
• API layer for intermediary integration
• Testing, stress-testing, and audit

Category 2: Intermediary and Distribution Infrastructure

• Wallet application development (mobile, web, card-based)
• Point-of-sale terminal upgrades or development
• Bank and PSP system integration
• Offline payment hardware (NFC cards, SIM wallets, wearables)

Category 3: Regulatory and Governance Infrastructure

• AML/CFT compliance engines and fraud detection systems
• KYC onboarding infrastructure
• Rulebook development and governance frameworks
• Legal framework development and legislative process

Category 4: Ongoing Operations

• Technology maintenance and upgrades
• Intermediary compensation models
• Customer support infrastructure
• Cyber security monitoring and incident response
• Staff and organizational capacity

The only jurisdiction to publish detailed cost data is the EU. The EUR 1.3 billion development cost and EUR 320 million annual operating cost for the digital euro provide the most transparent benchmark. For context, this development cost is roughly equivalent to building a new Eurosystem payment system -- comparable in scale to TARGET2 infrastructure investments. South Korea's Project Hangang offers a rare developing-pilot data point: ~5 billion won (~US$3.7M) of bank infrastructure spend per participant against only ~US$515,000 of total pilot transaction value — a cost-to-activity ratio that contributed to the project's mid-2025 pause.

For small island developing states (SIDS) like

The Bahamas and

Jamaica, CBDC development represents a disproportionately large share of central bank budgets. The ECCB's decision to suspend DCash 2.0 in favor of a Fast Payment System (February 13, 2026) may partly reflect the cost calculus: a fast payment system plus CARICOM Payments and Settlement System (CAPS) integration achieves many of the same goals at lower cost and complexity.

Brazil's November 2025 decommissioning of the Hyperledger Besu Drex platform — and decision to rebuild "from scratch" around a narrower collateral/lien-reconciliation use case — is a parallel signal that ambitious DLT-based programmable-money builds can outrun their justifiable cost.

Sources:

• ECB, "Eurosystem moving to next phase," October 30, 2025 -- Link
• ECCB, "Communiqué of the 112th Meeting of the Monetary Council," February 13, 2026 -- Link

3.2 Intermediary Compensation: The Unsolved Problem

A CBDC that charges no fees to users must still compensate the intermediaries (banks, PSPs) that distribute it. This creates a structural economic challenge:

The EU approach (under negotiation): The digital euro regulation proposes merchant fee caps, with two competing methodologies:

• Method 1 (cost-based): Regulator caps fees based on average cost plus reasonable profit of the most efficient merchant PSPs
• Method 2 (market-based): Alignment with existing interchange fee structures (Spain proposed capping the inter-PSP fee at 0.2%, aligned with the Interchange Fee Regulation for debit cards)
• Merchant advocates (EuroCommerce) propose an inter-PSP fee of 0.05% with a 2-cent/transaction cap, and total merchant service charge capped at 4 cents/transaction

If fees are too low, intermediaries have no incentive to invest in distribution. If fees are too high, mandatory acceptance imposes costs on merchants that undermine the value proposition. The ECON Committee vote on the draft Regulation is scheduled for June 23, 2026, which will shape the final fee architecture.

The China approach: The PBOC does not charge authorized operators or individual users for e-CNY services -- a zero-fee model subsidized by the central bank. This is feasible for the PBOC given China's fiscal capacity, but unsustainable for most central banks. From January 1, 2026, China layered interest (initial 0.05% on verified Cat 1-3 wallets) onto this model to stimulate holding — a further subsidy rather than a fee solution.

The Caribbean approach: In

Jamaica, the BOJ has offered to cover half the cost of POS terminal upgrades, but banks have been slow to invest even with the subsidy; Governor Byles called the slow adoption "a disappointment" (May 27, 2026), with JN Bank expected to be the first DTI to retrofit POS machines by July 2026. In

The Bahamas, commercial banks resisted Sand Dollar integration until the CBOB announced mandatory participation (July 2024), with a roughly two-year compliance deadline (effective ~mid-2026).

Sources:

• EuroCommerce, "Merchants need the simplest digital euro fee model," March 2026 -- Link
• PayTechLaw, "Fair merchant fees for the digital euro" -- Link
• Jamaica Observer, "Byles blasts banks over Jam-Dex delays," February 25, 2026 -- Link

3.3 Benefits: What Has Actually Materialized

The theoretical benefits of CBDCs are well-established in BIS and IMF literature. The question for policymakers is which benefits have actually materialized in practice.

Payment Efficiency

• China: The e-CNY has demonstrated that a CBDC can process payments at scale (300,000+ TPS claimed; NOT independently verified). Integration with Alipay and WeChat Pay ecosystems has been technically successful. However, the e-CNY has not demonstrably improved payment efficiency beyond what these platforms already provided.
• Caribbean: In
  The Bahamas and
  Jamaica, CBDCs have not meaningfully displaced cash or improved payment efficiency. The Sand Dollar represents ~$14 million in total churn over five years.
• Wholesale exception: Where the strongest realized efficiency exists, it is on the wholesale side —
  Singapore's live overnight-interbank-lending settlement (November 2025),
  Australia's Project Acacia (A$4.4m wholesale CBDC issued across 8 use cases; DFCRC estimates A$24bn/yr potential gains — a self-reported research estimate), and
  Canada's Project Samara (CAD $100M tokenized bond settled with W-CAD, March 2026).
• Assessment: Retail payment efficiency gains have been marginal at best, because launched CBDCs entered markets where either (a) efficient digital payment systems already existed (China) or (b) the population preferred cash and lacked infrastructure (Caribbean, Nigeria). Wholesale/cross-border use cases show the stronger economic case.

Financial Inclusion

• China: The tiered wallet system (Category 4: phone-number-only) and hardware wallets theoretically enable unbanked access. China has an estimated 234 million unbanked adults (figure NOT VERIFIED/possibly outdated). However, the e-CNY's actual impact on unbanked populations has not been quantified in PBOC disclosures.
• Nigeria: The eNaira was explicitly designed for financial inclusion (~38 million unbanked adults). The IMF found that the CBN's phased approach -- initially restricting access to banked customers -- undermined the inclusion goal. The NIN requirement for Speed Wallets created barriers, as many unbanked Nigerians lack a National Identification Number.
• India: Targets ~190 million adults without bank accounts; offline e₹ (launched October 2025) is the primary rural strategy, with welfare-delivery pilots (PMGKAY food currency, Gujarat, Puducherry). Inclusion impact not yet quantified, and FY2025-26 circulation declined.
• Assessment: No launched CBDC has demonstrated measurable financial inclusion gains. The IMF's consistent finding across jurisdictions is that CBDCs have failed to reach the unbanked populations they targeted.

Monetary Sovereignty

• China: The e-CNY positions the PBOC to maintain sovereign control over digital payments as an alternative to platform-dominated ecosystems (Alipay, WeChat Pay). The stablecoin/RWA-tokenization ban (Yinfa No. 42, February 2026, with extraterritorial reach) and the Shanghai e-CNY International Operation Center for cross-border payments reinforce this objective.
• EU: The digital euro's strategic rationale centers on European "digital sovereignty" -- reducing dependence on non-European payment networks (Visa, Mastercard, American Express). All selected service providers are EU-controlled entities.
• Russia: The digital ruble is explicitly framed around sanctions-resilience and a sovereign in-house platform; its cross-border (BRICS Bridge) ambitions remain largely conceptual as of mid-2026.
• Assessment: Monetary sovereignty is the strongest realized benefit, though it is a defensive/strategic benefit rather than a measurable economic efficiency gain.

Sources:

• BIS Papers No. 123, "E-CNY: main objectives, guiding principles and inclusion" -- PDF
• IMF, "Nigeria's eNaira, One Year After," WP/23/104 -- Link
• Cornell University, "Nigeria's eNaira CBDC: What Went Wrong?" April 2023 -- Link

3.4 The CBDC Adoption Paradox

The central economic finding from more than five years of CBDC launches is what can be termed the CBDC adoption paradox: massive institutional investment producing minimal organic adoption.

The paradox in data:

• China invested billions (undisclosed) to build infrastructure now deployed across 26-29+ cities with 22 authorized operators (after the April 2026 doubling). Result: e-CNY accounts for a negligible share of mobile payments, and the government felt compelled to fundamentally redesign the system (adding interest from January 2026, reclassifying as bank deposits) to stimulate adoption.
• The EU projects EUR 1.3 billion in development costs, plus EUR 4-5.8 billion in banking sector implementation costs -- for a CBDC where 58% of surveyed European citizens say they are "unlikely or very unlikely" to use it for everyday payments (ECB survey, March 2025).
• Nigeria invested in Hyperledger Fabric infrastructure from Bitt Inc. for a population of 220 million. Result: 0.37% of currency in circulation after three-plus years, prompting an official admission that "Nigerians were not interested" (CBN official Musa Itopa Jimoha, November 2025).
• India's e₹ pilot, after a 334% surge, contracted ~24% in FY2025-26 — the first such decline for a major pilot — even as the RBI added offline functionality and welfare pilots.

Why the paradox exists:

1. CBDCs replicate existing functionality. In countries with existing digital payment systems (China's Alipay/WeChat Pay, India's UPI, Brazil's Pix), a non-interest-bearing CBDC offers no user-facing improvement. Users asked "what does this do that my current app cannot?" and found no compelling answer.

2. CBDCs compete with cash where cash is preferred. In cash-dependent economies (Nigeria, Jamaica, Bahamas), the barriers to digital adoption (infrastructure, literacy, trust) are not solved by introducing a new digital instrument. Users who prefer cash for privacy, simplicity, or cultural reasons do not switch to a CBDC merely because it exists.

3. Central banks are not retail service providers. As Nigeria's CBN official stated: "the central bank was not prepared to be a retail bank." Central banks lack the organizational culture, customer service infrastructure, and marketing expertise to drive consumer adoption.

4. Network effects require critical mass that CBDCs lack. Payment systems are subject to strong network effects: a payment method is only useful if both payer and payee accept it. Without widespread merchant acceptance, consumers have no reason to use CBDC; without consumer demand, merchants have no reason to accept it.

Sources:

• CoinTelegraph, "Europeans show little interest in digital euro, ECB survey reveals" -- Link
• HRF CBDC Tracker, Nigeria -- Link
• Carnegie Endowment, "Why Nigeria's Controversial Naira Redesign Policy Hasn't Met Its Objectives," January 2024 -- Link
• IMF, "Positioning CBDC in the Payments Landscape," Fintech Note 2024/006 -- Link

4. What Works and What Does Not

What Works

1. Two-tier architecture preserves banking system stability. Every CBDC that has operated -- and every CBDC in advanced design -- uses a two-tier model where the central bank issues CBDC to intermediaries who distribute to end users. The BIS foundational principles report (October 2020) established this as a core design feature, and real-world experience has validated it.

China's post-2026 deposit-money model further reinforces the intermediary role. No launched CBDC has caused measurable bank disintermediation.

2. Holding limits and non-remuneration constrain financial stability risk. The combination of wallet balance caps and (historically) zero interest rates has successfully prevented CBDCs from competing with bank deposits. The EU digital euro's modelled EUR 3,000 holding limit, combined with waterfall/reverse waterfall mechanisms, represents the most sophisticated approach to this challenge. ECB modeling suggests deposit outflows at this limit would average approximately 8.2% of retail sight deposits -- manageable within existing prudential frameworks. China's January 2026 introduction of a 0.05% interest rate on verified wallets is the first significant departure from strict non-remuneration among launched CBDCs and bears watching.

3. Offline payment capability addresses genuine resilience needs. The

Bahamas' Sand Dollar was designed specifically for hurricane resilience -- enabling commerce once wireless communications are restored after disaster.

China's SIM card wallets and NFC-based payments that work when phones are powered off demonstrate technical feasibility, and

India launched offline e₹ (NFC tap-and-pay, feature-phone) at the Global Fintech Fest in October 2025. The EU digital euro's offline solution (Giesecke+Devrient), using cryptographically secure tokens transferred device-to-device, represents the most privacy-preserving approach. The BIS Project Polaris has published a handbook for offline CBDC payments confirming both feasibility and importance.

4. Cross-border and wholesale CBDC pilots demonstrate efficiency gains. The BIS Innovation Hub's mBridge project (reaching MVP in June 2024; handed to participating central banks October 2024) demonstrated that multi-CBDC platforms can reduce cross-border settlement from days to seconds.

Singapore executed its first live wholesale CBDC transaction (November 2025),

Australia's Project Acacia issued A$4.4m of wholesale CBDC (final report 18 May 2026), and

Canada's Project Samara settled a CAD $100M tokenized bond (March 2026). These wholesale and cross-border use cases represent the strongest economic case for CBDC, even as retail adoption struggles.

5. Legal tender designation alone does not guarantee adoption, but its absence creates vulnerability.

Jamaica's explicit statutory legal tender status (Bank of Jamaica Amendment Act, 2022) and the EU's proposed mandatory acceptance obligation represent best practice. China's "legal vacuum" (draft amended PBOC Law unenacted since 2020) has been repeatedly cited as a governance weakness.

Sources:

• BIS, "Central bank digital currencies: foundational principles and core features," October 2020 -- Link
• ECB, "Technical data on financial stability impact," October 2025 -- Link
• BIS, "Project Polaris: handbook for offline payments with CBDC" -- Link
• BIS, "Project mBridge reached minimum viable product stage" -- Link

What Does Not Work

1. Launching without a clear value proposition beyond existing payment options. This is the single most consistent failure across all launched CBDCs. In every jurisdiction, users found that the CBDC offered "no use beyond what the normal naira or bank apps would do" (

Nigeria) or equivalent sentiments. The IMF Fintech Note 2024/006 on positioning CBDC in the payments landscape confirms that countries with mature fast payment systems or mobile money ecosystems face the weakest case for retail CBDC.

Thailand reached the same conclusion explicitly, concluding its 2024 retail pilot with "no plans for full-scale retail CBDC" because PromptPay already serves the need.

2. Coercive adoption strategies.

Nigeria's December 2022 cash restriction policy -- designed partly to force digital adoption -- triggered protests, bank attacks, and deepened public distrust. The policy created a severe liquidity crisis affecting the informal sector (65% of GDP). The eNaira was wholly inadequate as a replacement, with only N3 billion minted versus a N3.2 trillion physical cash supply. Coercion backfires because it destroys the trust that CBDC adoption requires.

3. Single wallet provider at launch.

Jamaica launched with only NCB Jamaica (Lynk) as the sole wallet provider, creating a bottleneck that persisted for years. Sagicor Bank was added as a third wallet provider (April 2024) but launched no public consumer wallet, and only in July 2025 did JN Bank (JN Pay) become the second public-facing wallet. The lack of competition and convenience severely constrained adoption.

4. Blockchain-based systems without commensurate benefits. The Eastern Caribbean's DCash, built on Hyperledger Fabric, suffered a ~56-day outage (January-March 2022) caused by expired identity certificates on blockchain nodes.

Nigeria's Hyperledger Fabric system provided no tangible user benefit over a centralized database while enabling comprehensive surveillance.

Jamaica's non-blockchain approach (eCurrency Mint / DSC3) avoided these technical fragilities.

Brazil's November 2025 decommissioning of its Hyperledger Besu Drex platform — after privacy/programmability tooling failed to mature — is the latest evidence that DLT is not a prerequisite. The BIS Project Tourbillon and the EU's N-XT settlement engine demonstrate that privacy and efficiency goals can be achieved without distributed ledger technology.

5. Phased rollout that excludes the target population.

Nigeria's initial restriction to banked customers undermined the financial inclusion objective from the start. The Speed Wallet's NIN requirement excluded the very unbanked population it was designed to serve. The IMF specifically identified this sequencing error as a key factor in the eNaira's failure.

6. Insufficient merchant infrastructure. Without merchants to accept CBDC, consumers cannot use it.

Jamaica had only ~2,379 registered merchants as of September 2024. The

Bahamas had 455 actively processing merchants as of March 2023. BOJ Governor Byles has expressed frustration that POS machines still cannot accept JAM-DEX without upgrades, and banks have been slow to invest despite central bank subsidies (Byles called slow adoption "a disappointment," May 2026).

Sources:

• Cornell University, "Nigeria's eNaira CBDC: What Went Wrong?" -- Link
• Venafi, "Digital Currency Hit by Expired Certificate" -- Link
• Jamaica Observer, "Byles blasts banks over Jam-Dex delays," February 25, 2026 -- Link
• Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, "Observations from the Retail CBDCs of the Caribbean" -- Link

5. Recommended Framework for Assessing CBDC Economic Viability

5.1 Pre-Launch Assessment Framework

Before committing to CBDC development, finance ministries should conduct a structured assessment across five dimensions. This framework synthesizes the IMF CBDC Virtual Handbook methodology, BIS foundational principles, and empirical lessons from launched CBDCs.

Dimension 1: Payment System Gap Analysis

Dimension 2: Cost-Benefit Estimation

Dimension 3: Demand Assessment

The EU experience provides a cautionary data point: 58% of European citizens report being unlikely to use the digital euro. Russian polling is similarly skeptical (>50% unwilling; ~30% intend to use — media-sourced, indicative only). Finance ministries should conduct rigorous demand surveys before committing resources, specifically testing:

• Willingness to use a government-issued digital payment tool
• Trust in the central bank to manage financial data
• Perceived gap between CBDC and existing payment options
• Specific use cases where consumers see value (disaster resilience, cross-border, privacy)

Dimension 4: Institutional Readiness

Dimension 5: Exit Strategy

No launched CBDC has published explicit exit criteria, which is a governance gap. Finance ministries should define:

• Minimum adoption thresholds (wallets, active users, transaction volume) at 12, 24, and 36 months post-launch
• Maximum acceptable cost-per-transaction relative to existing payment methods
• Conditions under which the CBDC would be scaled back to wholesale-only (as Nigeria is doing) or suspended (as the ECCB did with DCash 2.0)

Sources:

• IMF, "Central Bank Digital Currency Virtual Handbook" -- Link
• IMF, "Positioning CBDC in the Payments Landscape," Fintech Note 2024/006 -- Link
• BIS, "Central bank digital currencies: foundational principles and core features," October 2020 -- Link

5.2 Key Performance Indicators for CBDC Programs

Based on the evidence from launched CBDCs, the following KPIs are recommended for ongoing monitoring. The critical innovation is separating vanity metrics (wallet creation, total minted) from outcome metrics (active usage, economic impact).

Tier 1: Adoption Metrics (Monthly)

Tier 2: Economic Impact Metrics (Quarterly)

Tier 3: Policy Objective Metrics (Annual)

5.3 Exit Criteria: When Should a CBDC Be Scaled Back or Abandoned?

The evidence from launched CBDCs suggests that policymakers need explicit, pre-committed criteria for scaling back or abandoning a CBDC program. Two jurisdictions have already effectively reached this point:

Nigeria (pivoting to wholesale, November 2025) and the Eastern Caribbean (suspending DCash 2.0, February 2026).

Brazil has effectively re-scoped Drex (decommissioning its platform and rebuilding around a narrower collateral use case, November 2025), and

India's first circulation contraction (FY2025-26) is an early warning of the same dynamic.

Recommended exit decision framework:

Level 1: Scale-Back Trigger (Pivot to Wholesale) Activate if, 24 months post-launch, the CBDC meets any two of:

• Monthly Active Users < 1% of adult population
• CBDC as % of currency in circulation < 0.5%
• CBDC circulation contracting year-on-year (as India did in FY2025-26)
• Operating cost per transaction > 5x cost of existing digital payment per transaction
• Merchant acceptance < 5% of formal-sector businesses

Action: Suspend retail distribution. Redirect resources to wholesale CBDC for interbank settlement and cross-border payments, where the BIS evidence (Projects mBridge, Helvetia, Jura) and recent live wholesale pilots (Singapore Nov 2025, Australia Acacia, Canada Samara) show stronger economic justification.

Level 2: Program Suspension Trigger Activate if, 36 months post-launch, the CBDC meets any three of:

• All Level 1 criteria still met
• No measurable improvement in financial inclusion (survey-based)
• Cash in circulation has not declined (or has increased)
• Central bank operating costs for CBDC exceed projected budget by >50%
• Major technical incident (>24-hour outage) within past 12 months

Action: Suspend CBDC operations. Redirect resources to fast payment system development (as the ECCB has done with its FPS + CAPS pivot). Publish a post-mortem assessment. Preserve the option to resume if circumstances change.

Level 3: Program Termination Trigger Activate if:

• Program has been suspended for >18 months with no improvement in underlying conditions
• Alternative payment infrastructure (FPS, mobile money) has achieved the policy objectives originally assigned to the CBDC
• Cost-benefit analysis demonstrates negative net present value over a 10-year horizon

Action: Formally terminate the CBDC program. Migrate any remaining CBDC balances to commercial bank deposits. Publish lessons learned for the international community.

Governance safeguard: Exit criteria should be established before launch, published transparently, and reviewed by an independent body (such as the national audit office or an IMF Article IV review team). The absence of pre-committed exit criteria in all launched CBDCs to date has allowed programs to persist on institutional momentum rather than evidence of economic value.

Sources:

• Nairametrics, "CBN to expand eNaira for government payments," September 2024 -- Link
• Antigua News Room, "ECCB Suspends DCash 2.0 Development," February 2026 -- Link
• IMF, "Evaluating the Implications of CBDC for Financial Stability," Fintech Note 2025/008 -- Link
• IMF, "Central Bank Digital Currency: Progress and Further Considerations," Policy Paper No. 2024/052 -- Link

Verification Notes

This is a refresh synthesis mirroring the canonical per-jurisdiction fact matrix for all 20 jurisdictions (no new jurisdictions added this cycle). All adoption and transaction figures below are self-reported by the issuing central bank (or compiled by trackers such as the HRF CBDC Tracker / Kansas City Fed) and are flagged as such; none has been independently audited. Aggregates ("six launched/live CBDCs"; "no launched CBDC exceeds 0.5% of currency in circulation") are recomputed for N=20.

Launch / stance taxonomy (recomputed for N=20):

• Launched / live retail: Bahamas (Sand Dollar), Nigeria (eNaira), Jamaica (JAM-DEX), India (e₹, pilot-scale retail), China (e-CNY, pilot-scale) — plus Eastern Caribbean DCash, now discontinued/suspended (pilot concluded Jan 2024; DCash 2.0 suspended Feb 13, 2026).
• Wholesale live pilot, no retail: Singapore, Australia.
• Research / pilot / design (no launch): Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, EU (digital euro, pre-issuance), Russia (mandated 1 Sep 2026 launch; narrow live govt use since Jan 1, 2026), Sweden, UK, Ghana, South Africa.
• Anti-CBDC: United States (EO 14178 in force; statutory moratorium passed both chambers in differing, unreconciled forms, not enacted; Kevin Warsh sworn in as Fed Chair 22 May 2026).

Key refreshed data points this cycle:

1. China e-CNY: 2.25 billion wallets (Sep 2025); 3.48 billion cumulative transactions worth CNY 16.7 trillion (~USD 2.37 trillion) as of Nov 2025; average transaction ~CNY 428 (declined from CNY 1,895 in 2023); 22 authorized operators after +12 banks added April 2, 2026; reclassified toward bank-deposit money and 0.05% interest on verified wallets from Jan 1, 2026 (first quarterly payout Mar 20, 2026). All PBOC-aggregate, self-reported.

2. India e₹: e₹-R circulation ₹771.7 crore (~US$90M) as of 31 March 2026 — down ~24% YoY from ₹1,016.5 crore, the first reported circulation contraction (RBI Annual Report 2025-26, self-reported). ~7-8 million retail users; ~19 banks; offline e₹ launched Oct 2025.

3. Australia: Project Acacia final report 18 May 2026 — A$4.4m wholesale CBDC issued across 8 use cases (20 use cases total: 12 pilot + 8 PoC); DFCRC estimates A$24bn/yr potential gains (self-reported research estimate). Wholesale pilot, not a live retail launch.

4. Bahamas Sand Dollar: B$2,482,045 in circulation (0.39% of physical cash, early 2025); ~144,000 consumer wallets (Nov 2024) / ~138,000 personal (Dec 2024, +16% YoY); 20% cash increase confirmed (Tribune, Jan 2025).

5. Nigeria eNaira: N18.31 billion in circulation (~$11.4M, 0.37% of currency, Feb 2025); 98.5% wallet inactivity at one year (IMF WP/23/104); ~2.2M transactions by Jul 2024; wholesale pivot Nov 2025; cNGN stablecoin task force Oct 2025.

6. Jamaica JAM-DEX: ~282,274 registered wallets (end-2024, +7% YoY); J$258.5M (end-2024) / ~J$260.05m (end-2025) in circulation (~0.1%); transaction value +550% / volume +267% YoY (2025); ~2,379 merchants (Sep 2024); only two public wallets (Lynk, JN Pay); Byles called adoption "a disappointment" (May 2026).

7. Eastern Caribbean DCash: pilot concluded Jan 12, 2024; EC$2.45M (~US$906,551, ~0.16% of currency, Mar 2023); DCash 2.0 development suspended by the ECCB Monetary Council Feb 13, 2026 in favor of a Fast Payment System + CAPS (Communiqué published May 4, 2026). Transaction volume NOT VERIFIED (ECCB did not release granular figures).

8. EU digital euro: preparation phase closed Oct 2025; Governing Council moved to next phase 29-30 Oct 2025; PSP pilot call opened 5 Mar 2026; 12-month pilot H2 2027; potential first issuance during 2029; ECON Committee vote scheduled 23 June 2026. Development cost ~EUR 1.3bn; ~EUR 320M/yr operating; EUR 4-5.8bn banking-sector estimate is industry-sourced.

9. Sweden / euro area: ECB preparation phase concluded Oct 2025; e-Krona has no issuance decision (four-phase pilot concluded 2024); Riksbank conditions any inquiry on the digital euro Regulation being finalised.

10. United States (anti-CBDC): EO 14178 (Jan 23, 2025) is the only binding prohibition in force; GENIUS Act = S.1582 / Public Law 119-27 (stablecoin, signed Jul 18, 2025); CBDC moratorium (ROAD to Housing) passed both chambers in differing forms (Senate 89-10 Mar 12, 2026; House 396-13 May 20, 2026) but NOT reconciled/enacted; Kevin Warsh sworn in as Fed Chair 22 May 2026.

11. South Korea: Project Hangang Phase 1 — 692.46 million won (~US$515,000) total transactions against 5bn won ($3.7M) per-bank infrastructure spend; Phase 1 paused Jun 2025, Phase 2 restarted Mar 2026.

Items Not Independently Verified to Primary Source

• China's exact development costs (not publicly disclosed by PBOC); 300,000+ TPS claim; 234 million unbanked adults figure; the full April 2026 22-operator roster (not fully verified).
• Nigeria, Bahamas, Jamaica development costs (not publicly disclosed); Nigeria's ~13M wallet figure (circulates but not re-verified).
• Eastern Caribbean DCash granular transaction volumes (not publicly released).
• Australia DFCRC's A$24bn/yr potential-gains estimate (self-reported research estimate).
• China's exact e-CNY interest rate beyond the initial 0.05% headline; Russia pilot/projection figures (CBR self-reported).

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Last updated: 2026-06-04