CBDC Country Comparison Tables

Overview

This document synthesizes CBDC research from 20 jurisdictions into structured comparison tables. Each cell is sourced from the corresponding country research file and the canonical fact matrix. Where data is unavailable or not covered in the source material, the cell is marked "No data" or "NOT VERIFIED" as the underlying source records it.

Jurisdictions covered: Australia, Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, China, Eastern Caribbean, European Union, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States.

Status at a Glance (June 2026)

Of the 20 jurisdictions, 6 have launched or operated a CBDC with real money (Bahamas Sand Dollar, Jamaica JAM-DEX, Nigeria eNaira — all launched and legal tender; China e-CNY and India e₹ — operational at pilot scale; Eastern Caribbean DCash — launched as a pilot, now concluded and its successor suspended). Russia's digital ruble is in a pilot with a legally-mandated large-scale launch on 1 Sep 2026 and narrow live government/budget use since 1 Jan 2026, but is not yet a full live retail launch and so is not counted among the launched set. The United States is the only jurisdiction with an explicit anti-CBDC stance.

The tables that follow cover seven dimensions: Legal Status and Institutional Design (Table 1), Technology and Architecture (Table 2), Privacy and Data Protection (Table 3), Monetary Policy Design (Table 4), Financial Inclusion (Table 5), Cross-Border Participation (Table 6), and Adoption Outcomes for launched CBDCs (Table 7). Tables 1-6 cover all 20 jurisdictions. Table 7 covers only the six jurisdictions that have launched or operated a CBDC with real money.

Table 1: Legal Status & Institutional Design

Analytical notes:

The legal landscape divides into three clusters.

Cluster 1 — Enacted CBDC-specific legislation:

Russia (Federal Law 340-FZ),

India (Finance Act 2022 amending RBI Act),

Jamaica (BOJ Amendment Act 2022), and

Bahamas (CBOB Act 2020). These four jurisdictions have the strongest legal foundations, with statutory authority that goes beyond general central bank powers. The Eastern Caribbean also amended its founding treaty (ECCB Agreement Arts. 2 & 18) to confer legal-tender status during the DCash pilot, but the pilot has concluded.

Cluster 2 — Operating under existing central bank authority:

China,

Singapore,

Australia,

South Korea,

Thailand,

Japan,

Sweden,

South Africa,

Ghana,

Nigeria, and

Canada (where any CBDC would in fact require amendment of the Bank of Canada Act and Currency Act). This is the largest group, reflecting a preference for iterative experimentation before committing to bespoke legislation. The risk is that without dedicated law, CBDC programs lack the permanence and legal certainty needed for production deployment.

Cluster 3 — Explicit prohibition: The

United States is the only jurisdiction to formally bar CBDC development. The binding prohibition is Executive Order 14178 (January 23, 2025), which is in force. Statutory bans have advanced — H.R. 1919 passed the House 219-210, and a CBDC moratorium passed both the Senate (in the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, 89-10) and the House (396-13, amended) — but in differing, unreconciled forms, so no statutory ban is yet enacted. This makes the U.S. the only major economy to formally reject CBDC, doing so via executive action. New Fed Chair Kevin Warsh (sworn in May 22, 2026) reaffirmed opposition to a retail CBDC.

The

European Union occupies a unique position with a detailed proposed regulation (COM(2023) 369) that has not yet been enacted — it is further along the legislative path than Cluster 2 jurisdictions but has not yet crossed the threshold into Cluster 1. Its preparation phase concluded in October 2025, the Governing Council moved the project to the next phase on 30 October 2025, and the ECON Committee vote on the draft report is scheduled for 23 June 2026.

Five jurisdictions have granted their CBDC explicit legal tender status:

Bahamas,

Jamaica,

India,

Nigeria, and

Russia (the digital ruble being a "third form of the ruble"). China's e-CNY notably lacks codified legal tender status despite being the world's most advanced pilot.

Distribution model convergence: Every jurisdiction that has progressed beyond conceptual research has adopted or proposed a two-tier distribution model. No jurisdiction has pursued direct central bank-to-consumer distribution, reflecting a consensus that disintermediation of commercial banks is an unacceptable risk.

Table 2: Technology & Architecture

Analytical notes:

Technology choices reveal a spectrum from fully centralized to multi-DLT approaches.

DLT vs. centralized divide: The early assumption that CBDCs require blockchain/DLT is being challenged.

Brazil's pivot away from Hyperledger Besu — the Besu platform was decommissioned on 10 November 2025 and the project is rebuilding "from scratch" with technology TBD — is the most dramatic example. The BCB concluded that no privacy solution it tested (Zether, Starlight, Rayls, ZKP Nova, Hamsa) was production-mature against its "privacy trilemma" (confidentiality, programmability, and regulatory compliance cannot all be achieved simultaneously on a shared ledger).

Jamaica chose a centralized platform (eCurrency Mint DSC3) from the outset, avoiding blockchain entirely. The

European Union's choice of a centralized UTXO engine (N-XT) on TIPS rather than DLT is a deliberate departure from the blockchain-centric designs common in Asia-Pacific. Project Hamilton in the

United States similarly found a distributed ledger was not needed.

DLT adopters:

China uses a hybrid centralized/distributed architecture that gives the PBOC central control while allowing 22 authorized operators (after a doubling on 2 April 2026) to manage distribution.

Nigeria and Eastern Caribbean both used Hyperledger Fabric (via Bitt Inc.), with mixed results — the Eastern Caribbean suffered a roughly two-month outage from expired node certificates.

India uses Hyperledger Fabric for wholesale and an API-based, non-DLT approach for retail.

Sweden piloted on R3 Corda across four phases, and

Canada used Hyperledger Fabric for its wholesale Project Samara.

Multi-DLT strategies:

Australia (Project Acacia across Canvas Connect, Ethereum, Hedera, Redbelly, and the XRP Ledger) and

Singapore (SGD Testnet plus GL1) have adopted multi-DLT strategies for wholesale CBDC, testing across multiple platforms simultaneously. This avoids technology lock-in and generates comparative performance data.

Offline capability: This remains a critical differentiator with real-world consequences.

Ghana's offline-first design directly addresses the reality that an estimated ~47% of its population lacks internet access (a self-reported figure).

Bahamas designed offline capability specifically for hurricane resilience (still under development).

China offers NFC, SIM-based, and hardware-wallet solutions for offline use.

India officially launched offline Digital Rupee at the Global Fintech Fest in October 2025.

Sweden tested an offline card solution in Phase 4. The

European Union makes cash-like offline functionality a core feature.

Programmability:

India's purpose-bound welfare distribution (G-SAFAL, DEEPAM 2.0, PMGKAY),

Singapore's Purpose-Bound Money protocol, and

South Korea's government subsidy integration represent the most advanced programmability implementations. By contrast, the

European Union and

United Kingdom explicitly exclude central-bank programmability from their core designs.

Table 3: Privacy & Data Protection

Analytical notes:

Privacy design is the most contentious dimension of CBDC policy. The approaches can be grouped into four tiers.

Tier 1 — Maximum surveillance:

Russia (explicitly no anonymity, Gosuslugi/ESIA registration required, CBR and Rosfinmonitoring have full transaction visibility — rated "Very Weak") and

Nigeria (comprehensive monitoring, NIN/BVN-linked wallets, CBN has full transaction visibility). In both cases, the CBDC functions as a state surveillance instrument alongside its monetary function.

South Korea sits near this tier by its own admission — Governor Rhee said the design "chose to improve compliance at the sacrifice of privacy."

Tier 2 — Controllable anonymity:

China's "small anonymity, big traceability" model allows anonymous small transactions while the PBOC retains the ability to trace any transaction. This is a pragmatic middle ground that enables everyday privacy while preserving state investigatory capacity.

Tier 3 — Intermediated privacy:

India (tiered anonymity with reduced identity requirements for small-value),

Bahamas (tiered KYC across three levels),

Jamaica (BOJ does not see individual transaction identities; data held by the wallet provider), and the

United Kingdom (stated goal of "at least as private as current digital money"). These jurisdictions use the two-tier model to create a privacy buffer — the central bank is separated from individual data by commercial bank intermediaries.

Tier 4 — Privacy by design: The

European Union offers the strongest privacy protections: cash-like anonymity for offline transactions, pseudonymised online transactions, and an explicit design commitment that the ECB/Eurosystem would never identify users. This reflects the EU's broader GDPR-influenced approach.

Canada's research similarly favours strong privacy but concluded that purely cryptographic "hard privacy" is immature, preferring "soft privacy" (authorized access, controls, audits).

Brazil's experience is instructive as a cross-cutting lesson: privacy became the single most consequential obstacle, driving a complete pivot away from blockchain because no tested architecture reconciled banking secrecy, BCB supervisory visibility, and LGPD data-protection requirements. This suggests that privacy law may ultimately determine technology choice, not the reverse. The

United States case is the political endpoint of this concern — surveillance fears are the central justification for its anti-CBDC stance.

Data protection law coverage: Nearly every jurisdiction has an identifiable data protection framework (GDPR, LGPD, PDPA, POPIA, APPI, PIPA, DPDP, NDPA, etc.); the Bahamas relies on general confidentiality protections rather than a single named CBDC-relevant DP statute. Only the EU's proposed Digital Euro Regulation explicitly addresses CBDC privacy requirements within the regulatory text itself.

Table 4: Monetary Policy Design

Analytical notes:

Holding limits are the primary tool jurisdictions use to mitigate bank disintermediation risk.

Holding limit comparison (where a per-person retail figure exists):

The

European Union's modeled EUR 3,000 limit is the most conservative among major economies, reflecting strong bank lobbying and disintermediation concerns; under the Council's December 2025 position the ECB would set the actual limit within a Council-agreed ceiling reviewed at least every two years. The

United Kingdom's proposed GBP 10,000-20,000 range is substantially more generous, though the Treasury Committee has urged a lower figure closer to the EU's.

India's ₹1,00,000 limit is low in absolute terms but adequate for the target population.

The deposit-token convergence:

China's January 2026 reclassification is the most radical monetary policy shift in the CBDC landscape. By converting e-CNY holdings in commercial bank wallets into deposit liabilities (rather than central bank liabilities) and beginning to pay interest (0.05% from Jan 1, 2026, first payout Mar 20, 2026), China effectively moved away from the pure CBDC model toward a tokenized-deposit approach — a move that the Peterson Institute argues means the e-CNY may no longer qualify as a CBDC under standard definitions.

Brazil (Drex wDrex/rDrex tokenized deposits) and

South Korea (deposit-token hybrid via LG CNS) have taken similar approaches from the outset, preserving bank intermediation by design. This convergence suggests the distinction between "CBDC" and "tokenized bank deposits" may be dissolving in practice.

Interest-bearing CBDCs: Only

China has introduced interest on CBDC holdings (0.05% from January 2026), and this followed the reclassification to a deposit model. The

European Union,

United Kingdom,

India, and

Japan have all explicitly proposed or recommended non-interest-bearing designs to avoid competing with bank deposits.

Russia offers free transfers for individuals but no interest — the incentive is convenience and mandatory adoption rather than yield.

Disintermediation risk:

Russia's combination of a top-up-only monthly cap, uncapped wallet-to-wallet transfers, and mandatory adoption (from 1 September 2026) creates a high disintermediation risk profile. Banks in Russia will be required to offer digital ruble services, potentially accelerating deposit migration where other jurisdictions rely on stricter holding-limit safeguards.

Table 5: Financial Inclusion

Analytical notes:

Financial inclusion motivations divide sharply between developing and developed economies.

Developing economy approaches:

India has the most sophisticated inclusion-focused CBDC design, with programmable welfare distribution (G-SAFAL for agriculture, DEEPAM 2.0 for cooking gas, PMGKAY for food security, the last targeting 800 million beneficiaries) aimed at ~190M unbanked citizens — even as e₹-R circulation contracted ~24% YoY in FY2025-26.

Ghana's offline-first design directly addresses the reality that an estimated ~47% of its population lacks internet access — arguably the purest inclusion-driven CBDC program among all 20 jurisdictions, though the pilot was only declared "completed" in May 2026 and the retail eCedi remains unlaunched.

Nigeria targeted ~38M unbanked with simplified wallets (Speed Wallet requiring only a phone number), but 98.5% of eNaira wallets were inactive after one year — demonstrating that low barriers to wallet creation do not guarantee usage.

Bahamas designed its Sand Dollar specifically for archipelagic geography and hurricane resilience, yet measured inclusion impact remains limited after five years.

Developed economy approaches:

Australia (99%+ bank penetration),

United Kingdom (~1.2M unbanked),

Japan,

Singapore, and

Canada generally find that existing payment infrastructure already serves inclusion needs. Australia explicitly concluded there was "no clear public interest case" for retail CBDC; Canada's research found even modest friction ($1.50/month) drastically cuts uptake. The U.S. cites FedNow, established payment apps, and GENIUS-Act stablecoins as alternatives. These jurisdictions tend to pursue wholesale CBDC (for market efficiency) rather than retail CBDC (for inclusion).

China's bridging approach:

China's design bridges the developing/developed divide. With a large unbanked population (figure NOT VERIFIED/possibly outdated) in the world's second-largest economy, China developed hardware wallets for the elderly, SIM-based wallets that do not require smartphones, and a phone-number-only Category 4 wallet — the most comprehensive effort to bridge digital divides among any jurisdiction surveyed. Red-envelope campaigns and transit integration provided compelling use cases that drove adoption beyond inclusion into everyday convenience.

The inclusion paradox: Across jurisdictions, CBDC adoption has been lowest precisely where the inclusion need is greatest. The populations most likely to benefit (unbanked, rural, elderly) are also the most difficult to reach and the least likely to adopt new digital financial instruments.

Nigeria's experience is the starkest illustration: coercive measures (cash withdrawal limits during the naira redesign crisis) temporarily drove eNaira adoption but generated public backlash rather than sustainable usage.

Jamaica's 2025 growth (transaction values +550%, volumes +267% YoY) came from existing users transacting more, not new unbanked sign-ups.

Table 6: Cross-Border & Interoperability Participation

Analytical notes:

Cross-border CBDC participation is concentrated among a small number of highly active jurisdictions.

Cross-border leaders:

Singapore leads with participation in Dunbar, Mariana, Agora, Mandala (Phase 2 launched November 2025), the GL1 initiative, Cedar x Ubin+, and Project Ubin+ — the broadest cross-border portfolio of any jurisdiction surveyed, plus a November 2025 MoU with the Deutsche Bundesbank. Singapore treats cross-border interoperability as a core competitive advantage.

China and

Thailand are co-founders of mBridge (BIS Innovation Hub), the most advanced multi-CBDC cross-border platform, which also includes Hong Kong, UAE, and Saudi Arabia — though the BIS withdrew from mBridge in October 2024.

India confirmed its first BIS multilateral participation in 2025-26 (Projects Rialto and Mandala Phase 2) and proposed linking BRICS-member CBDCs.

BIS-coordinated projects: The BIS Innovation Hub serves as the primary coordinator for multilateral CBDC projects. Key projects and their participants among the 20 jurisdictions:

• Project Dunbar (multi-CBDC platform):
  Australia,
  Singapore,
  South Africa, Malaysia
• Project Stella (DvP and cross-border):
  Japan,
  European Union
• Project Agora (tokenized cross-border, 7 central banks):
  Japan,
  South Korea; first-phase report 27 May 2026
• Project Mandala (privacy-preserving compliance):
  Singapore,
  India (Phase 2)
• Project Rialto (instant cross-border settlement):
  India
• mBridge (multi-CBDC bridge):
  China,
  Thailand, Hong Kong, UAE, Saudi Arabia (BIS withdrew Oct 2024)
• Project Mariana (DeFi-inspired FX):
  Singapore, BIS, Swiss National Bank, Banque de France
• Project Icebreaker (cross-border retail):
  Sweden, Bank of Israel, Norges Bank
• Project Samara / Jasper (wholesale):
  Canada

Alternative networks:

Russia's BRICS Bridge initiative represents a parallel cross-border CBDC ambition outside BIS coordination, reflecting sanctions-driven exclusion from Western financial infrastructure — though it remains largely conceptual as of mid-2026, with key partners showing limited enthusiasm. The bifurcation of the global CBDC interoperability landscape into BIS-aligned and BRICS-aligned networks is a significant geopolitical development; India's April 2026 proposal to link BRICS-member CBDCs is a proposal, not an agreed arrangement.

Unique cross-border design: The Eastern Caribbean's DCash was the only CBDC worldwide designed from inception to operate across multiple sovereign territories (8 ECCU member states). This remains an unreplicated achievement, though the program is now concluded and its successor suspended in favor of a Fast Payment System and CAPS.

Domestic-only / no-meaningful-cross-border jurisdictions:

Bahamas,

Jamaica,

Nigeria, and

Ghana have no meaningful cross-border CBDC activity yet (Ghana has only announced a design-phase intent toward ECOWAS settlement). For small economies with high remittance dependence, this is a significant missed opportunity.

Table 7: Adoption Outcomes (Launched / Operated CBDCs Only)

This table covers only the six jurisdictions that have launched or operated a CBDC with real money: Bahamas, Jamaica, and Nigeria (launched, legal tender); China and India (operational at pilot scale); and Eastern Caribbean (launched as a pilot, now concluded and its successor suspended). Russia is excluded because its digital ruble is a pilot with a legally-mandated future launch (1 Sep 2026), not yet a full live retail launch. All figures below are self-reported by the issuing central bank or tracker unless otherwise noted, and should be treated as indicative.

Analytical notes:

Adoption data reveals a stark gap between launch and usage across all jurisdictions that have moved beyond pilot. All figures are self-reported and should be read as indicative.

Circulation as share of cash supply: Where data is available, CBDC circulation remains negligible.

Bahamas' Sand Dollar (B$2.5M, ~0.39% of physical cash) and

Nigeria's eNaira (N18.31bn, ~0.37% of currency in circulation) both represent less than 0.4% after years of operation. In the Bahamas, physical cash in circulation actually increased (~20%) despite the Sand Dollar's availability — a paradox that undermines the narrative that CBDC will reduce cash dependency. China's e-CNY was only ~0.16% of M0 (June 2023) despite its scale.

Wallet creation vs. active usage: The gap between wallet creation and active usage is enormous.

Nigeria's 98.5% wallet inactivity rate after one year (IMF WP/23/104) is the most dramatic failure metric in the global CBDC landscape.

Bahamas created ~144,000 consumer wallets but only a few hundred merchants actively process transactions. Creating a wallet is frictionless; creating a reason to use it is not.

China and India as outliers, and the decline signal:

China's e-CNY dwarfs all others in absolute terms (~2.25B wallets, ~3.48B transactions, CNY 16.7T cumulative value), reflecting the world's largest population, aggressive merchant/transit integration, and government-coordinated promotion. Yet its average transaction value fell from CNY 1,895 (2023) to ~CNY 428, and its January 2026 reclassification toward a deposit model suggests the pure CBDC approach was not achieving the scale the PBOC sought.

India's e₹-R, the second-largest pilot, registered its first-ever circulation contraction in FY2025-26, falling ~24% YoY to ₹771.7 crore, while e₹-W had already collapsed from ₹10 crore to ₹0.08 crore — a caution that pilot momentum can reverse.

Growth trajectories:

Jamaica shows the most promising relative growth (transaction value +550% YoY in 2025) but from a very low base and concentrated among existing users — outgoing Governor Byles called the slow adoption "a disappointment."

Failure and suspension: The Eastern Caribbean's DCash is the clearest failure case. A roughly two-month outage (2022) caused by expired Hyperledger Fabric node certificates destroyed user confidence and became a globally cited case study in CBDC technical risk. The ECCB ultimately concluded the pilot in January 2024 and suspended DCash 2.0 development on 13 February 2026, pivoting to a Fast Payment System and CARICOM (CAPS) integration instead.

Cross-cutting lesson: Across all jurisdictions, the pattern is consistent: technical launch is far easier than driving adoption. Bank cooperation, merchant acceptance, and compelling use cases matter more than the underlying technology. The jurisdiction with the highest adoption (

China) invested heavily in ecosystem integration — transit, merchant subsidies, government transfers — rather than relying on the CBDC's inherent features to drive demand.

Cross-Cutting Themes

1. The Wholesale Pivot

A significant trend across the 20 jurisdictions is the pivot from retail to wholesale CBDC.

Australia explicitly concluded that retail CBDC offers insufficient benefits given existing payment infrastructure, completing its wholesale Project Acacia in February 2026 (final report 18 May 2026).

Singapore has focused on wholesale from the start, achieving its first live wholesale CBDC transaction in November 2025.

South Africa's November 2025 Position Paper found "no compelling immediate need" for retail CBDC.

Nigeria is pivoting from retail to wholesale after the eNaira's adoption failure.

Ghana reframed the eCedi toward wholesale and cross-border use in May 2026.

Thailand completed its retail pilot but pivoted to a Programmable Payment Sandbox.

Canada scaled down retail work in 2024 while continuing wholesale experiments (Project Samara, March 2026). Eastern Caribbean suspended its retail successor in favor of fast payment systems. This pattern suggests that wholesale CBDC may be the more viable near-term application.

2. Fast Payments and Stablecoins as CBDC Alternatives

Several jurisdictions have concluded that fast payment systems — or privately-issued stablecoins — deliver most of the benefits of retail CBDC with lower risk.

Australia cites its New Payments Platform. The

United States relies on FedNow and GENIUS-Act (PL 119-27) stablecoins as explicit alternatives to a CBDC.

South Africa points to PayShap. The Eastern Caribbean suspended DCash 2.0 to prioritize a Fast Payment System.

Thailand pivoted to a programmable-payments/stablecoin sandbox.

Canada enacted a Stablecoin Act (Royal Assent 26 Mar 2026, not yet in force) and saw its first regulated CAD stablecoin launch (CADD, May 2026). This convergence raises a fundamental question: if fast payments and regulated stablecoins satisfy the same use cases, is retail CBDC necessary?

3. The Deposit-Token Convergence

China (January 2026 reclassification toward deposit liabilities, with 0.05% interest),

Brazil (Drex wDrex/rDrex model), and

South Korea (deposit-token hybrid, explicitly "an intermediate stage between a CBDC and stablecoins") are converging on a model where digital money is a bank deposit liability rather than a central bank liability. This blurs the traditional CBDC definition and may represent the future of programmable money — tokenized bank deposits supervised by central banks, rather than direct central bank issuance.

4. Geopolitical Dimensions

The CBDC landscape is bifurcating along geopolitical lines. BIS-coordinated projects (Dunbar, Stella, Agora, mBridge, Mariana, Mandala, Rialto) connect Western-aligned and neutral jurisdictions.

Russia's BRICS Bridge initiative creates an alternative network outside Western financial infrastructure, though it remains largely conceptual.

China participates in both BIS projects and BRICS coordination, positioning itself as a bridge;

India's April 2026 proposal to interconnect BRICS-member CBDCs (a proposal, not an agreement) adds to this dynamic. The

United States' ban on domestic CBDC (EO 14178, in force) combined with its promotion of stablecoins (GENIUS Act, PL 119-27) represents a distinct third approach — leveraging private-sector dollar-denominated digital assets rather than central bank issuance to maintain dollar dominance.

5. Technology Is Not the Binding Constraint

Across all 20 jurisdictions, technology has not been the primary barrier to CBDC success.

United States research (Project Hamilton) demonstrated 1.7M transactions per second.

Japan achieved 50K TPS with a 100K target.

China has processed ~3.48B transactions. Multiple DLT platforms (Hyperledger Fabric, R3 Corda, Hyperledger Besu, Hedera, Quorum) and centralized architectures have all proven technically viable. The binding constraints are adoption, regulatory design, privacy-law compliance, and political will.

The Eastern Caribbean's outage (expired certificates, not a fundamental technology failure) and

Brazil's pivot (privacy-law incompatibility, not performance) both illustrate that operational and legal challenges, not computational limits, determine CBDC outcomes.

6. The Privacy-Surveillance Spectrum

Perhaps the most consequential design choice for any CBDC is where it sits on the privacy-surveillance spectrum, reflecting national governance values more than technical constraints.

Russia and

Nigeria treat CBDC as a tool for comprehensive financial surveillance.

China seeks a middle ground ("controllable anonymity"). The

European Union and

Canada design privacy protections into the architecture itself (offline anonymity, central-bank exclusion from individual data). The

United States cited surveillance concerns as a primary justification for opposing CBDC entirely. These positions are fundamentally political, not technical — every architecture surveyed can be configured for more or less privacy.

Methodology

All data in these tables is sourced exclusively from the 20 jurisdiction research files in the CBDC Frameworks domain and the canonical fact matrix. Where a country file does not contain information for a given cell, "No data" or "NOT VERIFIED" is entered as the source records it. No external claims or inferences have been added. Country names are rendered consistently across all tables. Adoption and transaction figures in Table 7 are self-reported by the issuing authority and flagged accordingly.

Source Files

Asia-Pacific:

• Australia — regulations/asia-pacific/australia.md
• China — regulations/asia-pacific/china.md
• India — regulations/asia-pacific/india.md
• Japan — regulations/asia-pacific/japan.md
• Singapore — regulations/asia-pacific/singapore.md
• South Korea — regulations/asia-pacific/south-korea.md
• Thailand — regulations/asia-pacific/thailand.md

Americas:

• Bahamas — regulations/americas/bahamas.md
• Brazil — regulations/americas/brazil.md
• Canada — regulations/americas/canada.md
• Eastern Caribbean — regulations/americas/eastern-caribbean.md
• Jamaica — regulations/americas/jamaica.md
• United States — regulations/americas/united-states.md

Europe:

• European Union — regulations/europe/european-union.md
• Russia — regulations/europe/russia.md
• Sweden — regulations/europe/sweden.md
• United Kingdom — regulations/europe/united-kingdom.md

Middle East & Africa:

• Ghana — regulations/middle-east-africa/ghana.md
• Nigeria — regulations/middle-east-africa/nigeria.md
• South Africa — regulations/middle-east-africa/south-africa.md

Data Currency

All data reflects information available in source files and the canonical fact matrix as of June 4, 2026. CBDC programs are rapidly evolving; figures and status descriptions may change.

Coverage Notes

• "No data" / "NOT VERIFIED" entries are concentrated in jurisdictions at early research stages (Ghana, Sweden, Thailand, Japan, Canada) and on dimensions where the source files contain limited quantitative data.
• Wholesale-only jurisdictions (Australia, Singapore, South Africa) have "N/A" entries for retail-specific dimensions such as retail holding limits, retail financial-inclusion design, and retail privacy models.
• The United States is marked "N/A" or "anti-CBDC" across most dimensions: the binding prohibition is EO 14178 (in force), while statutory bans passed both chambers in differing, unreconciled forms and are not yet enacted.
• Table 7 (Adoption Outcomes) includes China and India despite their "pilot" classification because both have issued real money at scale. Russia is excluded because its digital ruble has a legally-mandated but not-yet-effected large-scale launch (1 Sep 2026).
• Eastern Caribbean is included in Table 7 as a concluded/suspended CBDC to capture lessons from its operational period (March 2021 - January 2024).
• All adoption and transaction figures in Table 7 are self-reported by the issuing authority or trackers and should be treated as indicative, not independently audited.
• Holding-limit USD equivalents in Table 4 analytical notes are approximate conversions for comparative purposes only.